Taiwan’s ability to command its military forces, communicate with its citizens, and coordinate with international allies is dependent on terrestrial, submarine, and satellite networks. In this Perspective, the author discusses the vulnerabilities of Taiwan’s information networks and proposes actions that Taiwan should take to mitigate lost capabilities if attacked by China.
Over the past several decades, China has labored to isolate Taiwan internationally and bind Taiwan’s future to China’s. Although reunification could be a peaceful continuation of current efforts, China poses a clear and growing military threat, as demonstrated by its increasing air and naval capabilities. It is impossible to know with certainty whether — or when — China will take military action against Taiwan, but if China does attack, it is very likely to attempt to control all communications on the island and prevent Taiwan’s contact with the rest of the world.
Taiwan can do much to counter China’s strategy, such as its announced “digital resilience for all” plan. In the larger sense, building “digital resilience” should include reinforcing the access of officials and public figures to communications networks, securing essential databases, developing alternative communications pathways to international audiences, and improving the physical security and cybersecurity of terrestrial infrastructure. Each of these topics is explored in this Perspective, which can serve as a useful complement to Taiwan’s digital resilience for all initiative.
This Perspective was conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).
This publication is part of the RAND Corporation Perspective series. RAND Perspectives present expert insights on timely policy issues. All RAND Perspectives undergo peer review to ensure high standards for quality and objectivity.
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