Research Questions
How can one assess a country’s capacity to resist a large-scale military attack?What is Taiwan’s capacity for resisting a large-scale attack by China?How might the assessment of Taiwan’s capacity change during a crisis or conflict?
Taiwan remains an important potential flashpoint between China and the United States. Given the geographic distance between the United States and Taiwan and the military challenge of defeating a major attack by China, an accurate assessment of Taiwan’s ability to sustain a defense can be a critical factor for U.S. decisionmakers and planners. In this report, the authors develop a framework for assessing a country’s capacity to resist a large-scale military attack. In that framework, a country’s ability to withstand such an attack depends on four variables: political leadership and social cohesion, military effectiveness, durability, and military intervention by an ally. The authors then use that framework to assess Taiwan’s capacity to resist an attack by China for 90 days — a posited minimum amount of time required for the United States to marshal sufficient forces to carry out a major combat intervention in East Asia. An accurate assessment of Taiwan’s ability to withstand a large-scale attack by China could help U.S. decisionmakers and planners better anticipate and respond in such a situation.
Key Findings
Taiwan is vulnerable to defeat by China within 90 days
The authors identify four key variables for evaluating a country’s capacity to resist a high-end attack: political leadership and social cohesion, military effectiveness, durability (i.e., the ability to manage and sustain the economic and human costs of conflict), and military intervention by an ally.
For insight into Taiwan’s capacity, analysts should pay close attention to the quality and strength of Taiwan’s political leadership and the degree of social cohesion in the lead-up to a crisis or conflict. The other variables should be regarded as of secondary importance.
Even though Taiwan has fewer armaments and troops than China does, that does not doom the island to defeat. However, even if Taiwan’s military dramatically improves its combat-effectiveness, China’s military advantage will likely continue to grow because of China’s enormous resource advantage.
The impact of severe casualties and economic loss likely would cut two ways in a major war. Initially, Taiwan’s public probably would rally around the national leadership and favor resisting an aggressive China. However, over the long term, heavy costs of conflict likely would erode public support for continuing the war.
Because of Taiwan’s military disadvantages and low durability, successfully withstanding a large-scale Chinese attack would require military intervention by the United States. A well-led and socially cohesive Taiwan might be able to mount a determined resistance for a long time, but, without a robust U.S. military intervention, China’s enormous advantage in military resources likely would allow it to eventually subjugate the island.
Recommendations
U.S. officials can help Taiwan counter Chinese information operations and economic coercion. Chinese authorities have frequently employed such methods as a low-risk way to advance the country’s goals, but these tactics have thus far been met with little success in Taiwan. Taiwan is generally better positioned to counter these non-war tactics, but U.S. support in such efforts will remain important.
Finally, even if Taiwan’s political leadership and social cohesion are strong and its military is expected to be effective against China’s military, U.S. military intervention would be required for Taiwan to withstand a major attack. The speed, clarity, and credibility of any pledged U.S. military support could be a critical factor in sustaining Taiwan’s ability to resist.
Table of Contents
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Key Variables for a Country’s Capacity to Resist an Attack
Chapter Three
Peacetime Assessment of Taiwan’s Capacity to Resist a Large-Scale Attack
Chapter Four
How a Crisis or Conflict Might Affect Taiwan’s Capacity to Resist a Large-Scale Attack
Chapter Five
Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations
Appendix A
Taiwan’s Economic Dependence on China
Appendix B
China’s Potential Tools of Economic Coercion
Appendix C
Taiwan’s Options for Countering China’s Economic Coercion
This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).
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